and since Syria would be the only player left with direct interests at stake, the implications are obvious. However, Lebanese parties allied to Damascus should not rejoice at this prospect, and neither should the Assad regime, for the previous experience of Syrian "tutelage" eventually developed more costs than benefits for both sides.

Difficult as it may be in the climate of absurdity following the 12th postponement of Lebanon's presidential election, both the ruling March 14 coalition and its March 8 opponents need to step back and take stock of where the country is and how both of them have helped to push it there. Months of mudslinging and shortsighted politicking have caused the two sides to lose sight of the national interest - and also of their own respective priorities. The goals of the opposition's dominant component, Hizbullah, have been obscured in the fog of accusation and counter-accusation, as have those of March 14's larger factions.

If neither side can define its own program apart from a desire to best the other, the Lebanese people are not nearly so confused. They want only to live, work and study in a free and sovereign land that pursues its own agenda rather than those of outsiders. Unlike the politicians, they understand that their country can no longer be a servant to foreign masters - be they Syrian or American, Israeli or Iranian.

Both March 14 and March 8 - and their respective backers - can expect dire consequences from any attempt to bypass public opinion by dragging this country into regional and international struggles. This applies especially to Syria, which has a lot more to gain from entering into a partnership of mutual and voluntary cooperation with Lebanon than from the instability that would result from trying to recreate the unequal relationship that prevailed until 2005.